The decision yesterday by the US Department of Homeland Security to scuttle its plans to develop an exit system that would digitally record when a foreign visitor to the United States left the country is a good example of how the federal government (and sometimes corporations) overestimate how and at what cost technology can solve a particular problem.

Just weeks after 9/11, Congress hastily passed the U.S. Patriot Act, which, among other things, called for the development of an entry-exit system that would confirm the identity of foreigners entering the United States, as to keep out criminals and those deemed a terrorist threat. The system, called US VISIT, also was supposed to digitally record when the foreign visitor left the country. Congress dictated very tight deadlines for deploying the system, declaring the system must be operational in 115 airports and 14 major seaports by Dec. 31, 2003, and to the 50 busiest land border crossings by Dec. 31, 2004.

DHS met the deadlines for the entry part of the system largely because it could rely on legacy systems scattered thourghout the government, which could be linked and tweaked to do the job. The problem is that the Unites States had no legacy systems for the exit portion of the system. DHS would have to build that part from scratch, which meant it would take longer, increase the risk of failure, and cost a lot more than the $380 million spent for building the entry portion of the system -- billions of dollars more, according to the Government Accountability Office. Given those deadlines, it wasn't going to happen, admitted Scott Hastings, the former CIO for US VISIT who left the his position this past summer.

But no one on Capitol Hill took the time to ask what was realistic. This is a common occurrence in Washington. Congress' unrealistic expectations for what technology can do, and how fast it can be built to do it -- without asking the hard questions of what it will cost and what can be accomplished -- frequently puts agency CIOs in a lose-lose situation. In the case of US VISIT, Congress required DHS by law (under the Patriot Act) to have US VISIT operational by unrealistic deadlines, increasing the risk of the project exponentially. Moreover, Congress was operating under a highly charged atmosphere of fear brought about by the attacks and extreme pressure to do something, anything, to respond. There was no time or political will to debate what was doable and what could be technological overreach.

Congress has a role in the failure to deliver an entry and exit system. If Congress doesn't want to take the time to educate themselves on the ins and outs of IT management, they at least need to ask federal CIOs what is in the realm of the possible. And that requires elevating the CIOs' role in organizations to a top executive. But CIOs need to do their homework as well. They need to develop managerial skills that will serve them well in shaping decisions, if they are asked. CIOs would do well quickly learn the art of managing expectations and influencing strategies to avoid overblown expectations.

 --Allan Holmes

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